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A wave of revolutions is spreading like wildfire throughout the Arabic world which is 
remarkable and undeniably historic. What intrigues even more is Europe’s position in this 
change, with the recent introduction of a weapon embargo and no-fly zone in Libya. The 
‘west’ has realized rather late that it has an important stake in shaping the democratization 
process, based on the reasoning that the existence of similar societies is advantageous for 
Europe’s foreign policy interests. While the French and American motives are reasonably 
well understood, the reasons behind Belgium’s engagement are not openly questioned or 
analyzed. Parliament almost unanimously approved the country’s commitment (0 against, 125 
for and 1 abstention), justifying Belgian participation as an act to protect human rights. 
Why did Belgium become part of the coalition of the willing by offering six F16 jets and one 
mine-sweeper? The answer is multifaceted and complex. The human rights argument is 
clearly an important factor for a small country as Belgium that bases its foreign policy on 
democratic values, for instance towards the Congo. But this does not explain why a country 
that prefers to stay out of wars – no involvement in first and second Gulf War, Afghanistan or 
Iraq, and the policy guideline of the Rwanda doctrine that states that no military personnel 
will be deployed to former colonies – was so fast to decide on participation in a conflict that 
Germany stays out of and that does not have a clear command structure or goal? 
The answer lies in the specific circumstances that have facilitated the implementation of a 
fundamental line for Belgian foreign policy, a line that I draw in my own ongoing research on 
Belgian Cold War diplomacy. During the Cold War, Belgium focused on building a 
reputation as a reliable ‘go between’, not out of a sense of altruism or to gain more stability in 
the international system to sell more goods and services. It wanted to build a reliable 
reputation to set the agenda, in effect gaining a form of power. The decision on Libya is 
rooted in this fundamental driver. The policy to reach this goal is facilitated by internal and 
external factors that explain the fast pace of decision making. 
Belgium’s adherence to a specific form of multilateralism, which I call ‘European 
Atlanticism’, is a first external factor. The principal actors fit in this scheme. France took the 
lead in this operation in agreement with the Americans. The operation is furthermore backed 
up by a broad U.N. resolution giving it international legitimacy and making ‘international 
law’ one of the most quoted words during the parliamentary debate. The conflict furthermore 
takes the form of an air operation, giving it the outlook of a rather low-risk undertaking out of 
which the country can easily withdraw. 
Even more important than the beneficial international environment are the domestic factors. 
Because of the government formation crisis, Belgium is ruled by a temporary government. 
Elections are far away – everybody knows they would not solve the problem –  and ministers 
have a lot of room to act because they are not fully checked by parliament. Belgian 
participation furthermore offers a desperately needed gesture of unity in a country hopelessly 
divided between language groups. 
Lastly, there is the weighty factor of personalities. Prime minister Leterme needs a reputation 
boost after his political career took the form of a Greek tragedy. More important is the 
minister of defense, Pieter De Crem, also known as ‘Crembo’. His policy is aimed at making 
the Belgian army small and agile, easy to dispatch all over the globe for peace keeping and 
other operations. It is his response to the post-Cold War decline of the Belgian Army. The 
question remains open if these premises on which the decisions were taken are correct. Can 
Belgium easily withdraw from the conflict if it goes wrong? Should Belgium participate in an 
operation that wants to eliminate Khadaffi? What if the protection of human rights becomes a 
long term commitment? These are highly problematic issues that are not answered. 
Why is Belgium’s decision to participate in the ‘coalition of the willing’ not questioned by the 
public? There are two main reasons. There is first of all, the haze of secrecy that surrounds 
foreign affairs and defense in Belgium. People (even professional observers) simply do not 
know what Belgium’s foreign policy is, making it difficult to evaluate Belgium’s engagement 
in Libya. Parliament was for instance informed about the fact that Belgian soldiers had 
responded to enemy fire in Afghanistan, but they did not inform the public. Despite the fact 
that this was problematic – Belgian soldiers are there merely to train the Afghan military – the 
parliamentarians did not feel the need to communicate this news. Only after an amateur 
recording of combatants in Afghanistan became public did official statements pour out and a 
camera crew was allowed, with strict restrictions, to film the Belgian forces.  Furthermore, 
Belgian foreign affairs archives are willfully underfunded and unorganized to make historical 
research as difficult as possible, notwithstanding the hard work of the staff. By contrast, in the 
Dutch archives there are clear rules for de-classification and the obligation to deposit 
documents coming from foreign affairs in the National Archives. While the Netherlands is a 
small country too, where there is consequently not as much interest for foreign policy, there is 
more openness and debate about Dutch foreign policy. The fall of Dutch governments over 
Sebrenica and Afghanistan are examples of this. It is therefore a false argument to state that 
Belgium is a small country and its population thus not concerned with foreign policy. This 
uncritical stance is highly problematic especially because it is unclear what the ultimate goal 
is of the war in Libya and because a British Expeditionary Force has also landed on Libyan 
shores to enforce the no fly zone, giving the ‘no ground troops’ provision in the resolution a 
flexible interpretation. 
Considering the expertise of the Belgian special forces (the only division of the Belgian army 
that is properly funded), some sort of cooperation is not as improbable as it may seem at first 
glance. Sending ‘advisors’ or the like is one of the oldest tricks in the book. Despite public 
statements to the contrary, the ‘rules of engagement’ are far from clear because the goal of the 
military intervention is far from clear. That is why the Belgian intervention in Libya merits 
our closest attention. 
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